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Abstract 
 Security evaluations of electronic cash (e-cash) schemes usually produce an abstract result in 
the form of a logical proof. This paper proposes a new method of security evaluation that produces a 
quantitative result. The evaluation is done by analyzing the protocol in the scheme using the Markov chain 
technique. This method calculates the probability of an attack that could be executed perfectly in the 
scheme’s protocol. As proof of the effectiveness of our evaluation method, we evaluated the security of 
Chaum’s untraceable electronic cash scheme. The result of our evaluation was compared to the evaluation 
result from the pi-calculus method. Both methods produced comparable results; and thus, both could be 
used as alternative methods for evaluating e-cash security. 
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1. Introduction 
Security is the most important aspect of an electronic cash (e-cash) scheme. A lack of 
security in an e-cash scheme presents users with the risk of financial loss. As such, a scheme 
must prove that it is able to mitigate or eliminate these risks. The security evaluation of an e-
cash scheme provides the basis of whether a scheme can be implemented. The evaluation 
assesses the scheme’s protection from attacks on its operation. To be implemented, a scheme 
does not necessarily need to meet all the security criteria. The operational environment and the 
scheme’s objectives determine the security criteria that need to be met. 
The common security criteria in e-cash are: double-spending, anonymity, forgery, and 
exculpability [1-3]. To fulfil the criterion on double spending, the e-cash scheme should not allow 
users to use the same e-cash data in more than one transaction. Anonymity requires that no 
one should be able to determine the owner of the e-cash from the data itself. This may be 
further classified into smaller categories depending on the level of secrecy required [2]. The  
e-cash scheme should also prevent forgery; i.e., the generating of e-cash data without involving 
the proper protocol or involving an illegal party. The last criterion, exculpability, requires that the 
e-cash issuer or manager should not be able to accuse an honest user of double spending. 
Also, the issuer should not be able to create e-cash data without the request of a legitimate 
user. The most common evaluation method of an e-cash scheme is the random oracle model, 
which evaluates the cryptographic scheme that formed the basis for the e-cash scheme [4-9]. 
The analysis is conducted via a simulation between an adversary (an entity with the intention to 
attack the scheme), and an oracle (a query-processing machine). The random oracle model 
provides logical proof to the security, but not a quantifiable number that measures the security 
of the system. The random oracle model assumes an idealized environment where the 
adversary is bound to a fully restricted environment. The adversary must follow the simulation 
rules to send a query to the oracle. In this simulation, no other external entity can intervene with 
the communication between the adversary and the oracle. Due to these assumptions, the 
security of a scheme regarding the random oracle model might differ significantly from the 
security of its actual implementation [10]. Some researchers also believe that the random oracle 
model is too strong as a proof. It creates a faction that reject the usage of random oracle model 
as a security proof for any cryptographic implementation [11]. 
The usage of random oracle model usually relies on some mathematical  
assumption [8, 12]. In this kind of security model, the security of the scheme is based on the 
difficulty to solve the mathematical problem used as the assumption. For example, many 
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schemes rely on a variation of Diffie-Hellman problem as the assumption of its security model. 
Since the difficulty of Diffie-Hellman problem is quite well-known, then it is quite difficult to break 
the e-cash scheme that implement Diffie-Hellman problem as its main security mechanism. 
Another approach is to evaluate the security of cryptographic primitive used in the e-cash 
scheme, such as the digital signature scheme. As we can see in various works in digital 
signature [13-16], the process to evaluate the security is using logical proof. The result provides 
a strong basis to determine the security of the cryptographic primitive, and in the end ensure the 
security of the e-cash scheme that using the primitive. Dreier et al., [17] propose another 
method of e-cash security evaluation using pi-calculus. Rather than evaluating the cryptographic 
scheme using the random oracle model, their method evaluates the protocol, which represents 
the operational step-by-step procedure of the e-cash scheme. As such, the pi-calculus method 
can simulate the implementation condition more closely than the random oracle model can. In 
their paper, Dreier et al., use an implementation of this method, ProVerif, to analyze the 
implementation of Chaum’s scheme [1]. 
Both the random oracle model and the pi-calculus method produce qualitative results as 
proofs of security. The results of these evaluation methods do not provide a number which could 
be used as a basis of measurement or comparison of security levels. Instead, they only provide 
logical reasoning that states why the scheme is secure. These logical proofs can be difficult to 
understand for someone without a background in computer science or mathematics. This paper 
proposes a method for evaluating the security of e-cash which produces a numerical result. This 
method uses a similar approach to the method in [17], by evaluating the protocol. Our method 
calculates the probability of a security risk using a Markov chain technique. This method 
provides a quantitative result that is indicative of the implementation conditions. In this paper, 
we also provide a sample calculation for this evaluation method by measuring the security of 
Chaum’s untraceable e-cash scheme [1]. The evaluation result is then compared to the results 
of Dreier et al.’s pi-calculus evaluation of the same e-cash scheme. 
 
 
2. Proposed Method 
The proposed method of evaluation consists of four phases: redefining the protocol into 
its formal description, constructing the attack scenario, constructing the transition matrix, and 
calculating the Markov chain probability. This method assumes that it is possible to calculate the 
probability of an attack on the cryptographic scheme used in an e-cash scheme. The phases of 
our evaluation method can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed method of evaluation 
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2.1. Redefinition of Formal Description 
The first phase of the evaluation is to redefine the protocol in the e-cash scheme to 
make it suitable for evaluation using Markov chain techniques. The Markov chain evaluates the 
probability of transition between states, while e-cash protocols are usually in the form of  
step-by-step algorithms which do not describe the protocol state. Therefore, the common 
description of e-cash protocol cannot be used as a basis for protocol evaluation using Markov 
chain techniques. For our method, we use a finite state model as the formal description model. 
The protocol is modelled as a state diagram which shows states and the transitions between 
them. The state diagram provides the basis for forming the transition matrix. Since e-cash 
protocols are usually not state-oriented, determining the states from the protocol is often not a 
straightforward process. One possible approach is to evaluate the purpose of each data 
transaction in a protocol to determine the state involved and its transitions. 
 
2.2. Constructing Attack Scenarios 
This phase aims to generate the success probability of an attack on the cryptographic 
scheme used in an e-cash scheme. Most e-cash schemes rely on one or more cryptographic 
schemes for their basic security. The strength of a cryptographic scheme depends on the kind 
of adversary it is protected from. The success probability of an attack might differ depending on 
which party involved in the process is honest. Even if the calculation shows that the probability 
of a successful attack on a cryptographic scheme is unacceptable, the e-cash scheme can 
remain secure. It may have some other mechanism in its protocol to reduce or mitigate the risk 
associated with the attack. 
 
2.3. Constructing the Transition Matrix 
In this phase, we build transition matrices based on the results of the first and the 
second phase. A transition matrix is built for each attack scenario generated from the second 
phase. This matrix will be used as the base tool for calculations in the next phase. A state in an 
e-cash protocol can usually only change into two other states. If the output of the state complies 
with the rule of the protocol, it changes into the next correct state. If the output does not comply 
with the rule, it changes into the “ABORT” state and ends the protocol. As such, the transition 
matrix can be represented as follows: 
 
𝑃 =
𝑆1 𝑆2 𝐴
𝑆1
𝑆2
𝐴
(
0 𝑎 1 − 𝑎
𝑏 0 1 − 𝑏
1 0 0
)
 (1) 
 
The equation above involves three states: 𝑆1, 𝑆2, and 𝐴. States 𝑆1, 𝑆2 are the proper 
state that the protocol should follow. State 𝐴 is the “ABORT” state which becomes the end state 
if the proper condition is not met during the protocol run. The variables 𝑎, 𝑏 represent the 
probabilities that a state will change into the next state following the proper protocol. The values 
of 𝑎 and 𝑏 are the same as the probabilities of an attack on the cryptographic scheme 
calculated in the previous phase. This also depends on which attack scenario is being 
evaluated. For example, if all entities involved in this protocol are honest, then the 𝑎 = 1, 𝑏 = 1. 
If there is a dishonest entity, then the values of 𝑎, 𝑏 become the probability of that entity 
breaking the cryptographic scheme. 
 
2.4. Calculation of Markov Chain Probability 
The Markov chain probability determines the security of an e-cash scheme against 
certain attack scenarios. The security relates to the probability of an e-cash scheme completing 
its protocol (not ending in “ABORT” state) in every attack scenario. The probability is calculated 
using a general Markov chain, as follows: 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑛 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ ∈ 𝑃𝑛 (2) 
 
where 𝑛 denotes the number of steps needed to complete the protocol normally. The calculation 
only sees the probability of a transition from the protocol’s start state (𝑖) to its end state (𝑗) in 𝑛 
steps. The resulting probability is used as a quantitative basis to determine the security of the 
scheme. 
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3. Application in Evaluating Chaum’s E-cash Scheme 
In this section, we evaluate the security of Chaum’s offline e-cash scheme [1] using our 
method. The results of this evaluation are then compared to the evaluation done by Dreier et al., 
using the pi-calculus method [17] to gauge the effectiveness of our method.  
The analysis focuses only on the payment protocol of Chaum’s e-cash scheme. The 
scheme has another protocol, the withdrawal protocol, which is used in creating new e-cash 
data. The security of the withdrawal protocol does not contribute directly to the security of the 
scheme since the presence of a dishonest entity in this protocol results in neither gain nor loss. 
 
3.1. Redefining the Formal Description 
Although the payment protocol involves three entities (user, merchant, and bank), our 
evaluation sees the whole protocol as a single system, as the state diagram describes how the 
whole protocol works rather than how each entity behaves. 
The flow of the payment protocol in Chaum’s scheme is as follows: 
a. User sends e-cash data 𝐶 to Merchant. 
b. Merchant selects and sends random binary strings 𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑘 2⁄  (𝑧𝑖 ∈ {0,1}) 
c. For each binary string sent by Merchant, User sends back the appropriate proof-of-
ownership. 
d. If the proof does not match 𝐶, Merchant rejects the transaction and ends the protocol. 
Otherwise, the protocol proceeds to next step. 
e. Merchant sends 𝐶 and User’s proof to Bank. 
f. If Bank verifies the correctness of 𝐶, it settles the transaction. Otherwise, it aborts and 
traces the User. 
The result of redefinition of this protocol can be seen in Figure 2; it has five states and 
five transitions. Step (a) is described as the start of the protocol in the form of the REQUEST 
state. Steps (b to d) verify the validity of 𝐶. These steps are represented as the CHALLENGE 
state of the protocol. Step (e) describes the state that verifies the signature of Bank and checks 
for double spending. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. State diagram of payment protocol 
 
 
3.2. Constructing Attack Scenarios 
To construct the attack scenario, we needed to choose some implementation details for 
the e-cash scheme. In Chaum’s scheme, a digital signature is needed to create the e-cash data. 
This digital signature protects the scheme from forgery. For our evaluation, we chose to use the 
RSA signature scheme with modulus 𝑁 of order 1080 and security parameter 𝑘 = 50. Both 
values are secure enough to be chosen as implementation values. This determines the length of 
e-cash data and the number of random binary string needed during the CHALLENGE state. 
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We considered three attack scenarios: double spending, forgery, and exculpability. 
When calculating the success probability of each scenario, we also considered the entities that 
perform the attack. 
 
3.2.1. Double Spending 
The success probability of double spending depends on two things. First, the time 
elapsed between two VERIFY state that uses the same e-cash data. The longer the time, the 
smaller the success probability. Second, the probability of the merchants in both transactions 
using the same permutation of binary string in the CHALLENGE state. If this happens, the Bank 
still can determine that the data has been used during the VERIFY state in the second 
transaction occurs. However, since the Bank only possesses half of the proof-of-ownership for 
each 𝑧𝑖 due the nature of the blind signature used in the Withdrawal protocol, the Bank cannot 
determine the perpetrator of the double spending. Steps e and f in the payment protocol can be 
conducted much later than the actual transaction (due to the scheme being offline), so the user 
could still get away with double spending. 
The probability of this attack can be formulated as follow: 
 
𝑃𝑑𝑏 ≈ 𝑃(𝑧𝑖 = 𝑧𝑗). 𝑃(𝑇𝑒) (3) 
 
with 𝑖, 𝑗 denoting the two-different payment protocol involved in double spending and 𝑇𝑒 denoting 
the time elapsed between the two protocols. The first part of equation (𝑃(𝑧𝑖 = 𝑧𝑗)) represents 
the probability of combination of both proof 𝑖, 𝑗 are the same. The second part (𝑃(𝑇𝑒)) represents 
the probability due to elapsed time. 
In our evaluation, we did not consider the scenario where the User and Merchant 
collude to cheat the honest Bank by creating two different transactions and processes, both 
VERIFY states at the same time. In this scenario, although the probability of success is 𝑃𝑑𝑏 ≈ 1 
and the Bank would not be able to determine which User is involved in this double spending, the 
Bank could still detect the existence of double spending. It might not credit the Merchant 
account with settlement, leaving only the User with the benefit. As such, this scenario is unlikely. 
As such, we consider only the attack scenario where only the User is dishonest. The 
probability of both Merchants using the same binary string array corresponds to 
𝑘
2
= 25, which 
results in 𝑃(𝑧𝑖 = 𝑧𝑗) = 2.98 × 10
−7. The time elapsed component of (3) can be approximated as 
𝑃(𝑇𝑒) ≈ 0, since the time needed to change Merchant is likely to be relatively large. However, 
for our calculation we will use 𝑃(𝑇𝑒) = 10
−6, to represent a number that is practically zero but 
still large enough to be used in the calculation. The success probability of double spending by 
the User then becomes 𝑃𝑑𝑏 = 2.98 × 10
−13. 
 
3.2.2. Forgery 
Forgery can only be initiated by the User. To forge the e-cash data, the User needs to 
falsify the Bank signature. The probability of breaking the RSA signature is the same as the 
probability of factoring 𝑁 [18]. Given sufficiently long amount of time, the factoring theoretically 
can always succeed [19]. However, if we ignore the time needed to factor the number, the 
probability of breaking RSA is: 
 
𝑃𝑓 =
1
√
𝑁
2
≈ 10−40 (4) 
 
The process of verifying the signature happens in the VERIFY state by the Bank. In the 
CHALLENGE state, the Merchant only checks for the proper form of 𝐶. 
 
3.2.3. Exculpability 
The exculpability scenario could happen if the Bank was dishonest. To accuse an 
honest User for double spending, the Bank needs to break the blind signature. In common 
double-spending scenarios, the Bank could determine the User from the User’s response in the 
CHALLENGE state, which is transferred to the Bank in the VERIFY state. The  
proof-of-ownership for any e-cash data in [1] consists of two parts: 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑎𝑖 ⊕ (𝑢 ∥ (𝑣 + 𝑖)), 
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where 𝑎𝑖 is a random string/number chosen in withdrawal by User. The identity of the User is 
stored in 𝑢 as an account number, and 𝑣 denotes the counter associated with it. If the Bank has 
both pieces of information, it can extract 𝑢 to identify the User. To accuse an honest user of 
double spending, the Bank must acquire u from the second part of the proof without knowing 𝑎𝑖. 
The probability of successfully doing such an operation is proportional to the bit length of 𝑎𝑖. For 
the purpose of this evaluation, let 0 ≤ 𝑎𝑖 ≤ 1024, which makes the length of 𝑎𝑖 = 2
10. The 
probability of successfully extracting the User identity 𝑢 without having 𝑎𝑖 is: 
𝑃𝑒 =
1
𝑙
= 2−10 (5) 
 
where 𝑙 denotes the length of 𝑎𝑖. Having the Merchant collude with the Bank does not change 
this probability. To provide both parts of proof to the Bank, the Merchant needs to force the User 
to double spend the e-cash data, which is unlikely to be done by the user under normal 
circumstances. 
 
3.3. Constructing the Transition Matrix 
The transition matrix for Chaum’s payment protocol can be generated using the state 
diagram in Figure 2, together with the attack scenarios and their probabilities in section 4.2 the 
general transition matrix can be expressed in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Transition Matrix of Chaum's Payment Protocol 
Origin State PAYMENT CHALLENGE VERIFY SETTLE ABORT 
PAYMENT 0 1 0 0 0 
CHALLENGE 0 0 a 0 1-a 
VERIFY 0 0 0 b 1-b 
SETTLE 0 0 0 0 0 
ABORT 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
As stated in (1), the values of a and b depend on the attack scenarios. The probability 
of each scenario becoming the value of either a or b, depends on where the cryptographic 
attack is evaluated. The value of a and b for this evaluation is shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. The values of Transition Matrix Variables per Scenario 
Scenario Value 
Double spending 𝑎 = 1; 𝑏 = 2.98 × 10−13 
Forgery 𝑎 = 1; 𝑏 = 10−40 
Exculpability 𝑎 = 1; 𝑏 = 2−10 
 
 
3.4. Calculation of the Markov Chain 
For each attack scenario in Table 1, we calculated the probability that the protocol will 
end in the proper state using several normal steps. The start state of the evaluated protocol is 
“PAYMENT” state, as can be seen in Figure 2. The protocol should end its process in “SETTLE” 
state after three steps in the normal condition. Should an attack occur, the probability of this 
protocol ending in “SETTLE” state should be low; and the probability that it will end in the 
“ABORT” state should be high. 
By using (2), the probability of success for each attack can be seen in Table 3. Double 
spending has the probability of 2.646 × 10-38 to succeed. Forgery has lower probability 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≈ 10
−120. The exculpability scenario has the highest probability among the three scenarios, 
but it is still low. It can be concluded that it is improbable that any of the three attack scenarios 
would be carried out successfully. 
 
 
Table 3. The Success Probability in Each Attack Scenario 
Scenario Probability 
Double spending 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≈ 2.646 × 10
−38 
Forgery 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≈ 10
−120 
Exculpability 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≈ 9.313 × 10
−10 
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3.5. Comparison of Result with Pi-calculus Method 
Table 4 shows a comparison of results from the method used by Drier et al., and our 
method. Dreier et al., evaluated Chaum’s scheme with security properties defined [20]; 
whereas, our evaluation does not strictly follow those definitions. However, the results of the two 
evaluation methods should still be comparable. The results from Drier et al. are shown as “hold” 
(where the scheme meets the security criterion for that particular scenario) and “fail” (where the 
scheme does not meet the security criterion). Our results state whether the success of the 
attack scenario is probable, based on the probabilities calculated earlier. 
 
 
Table 4. Comparison of Results 
Property Dreier et al., Our Method 
Forgery Fail Improbable 
Double Spending Hold Improbable 
Exculpability Hold Improbable 
Weak Anonymity Hold Not applicable 
Strong Anonymity Hold Not applicable 
 
 
The evaluation results of double spending and exculpability are similar in both methods. 
It is useful to note that Dreier et al., evaluate the process of double spending only at the 
interaction between User and Merchant. The Merchant cannot determine whether e-cash data 
has been spent before. In our method, we evaluate the probability of double spending not only 
at the interaction of User and Merchant, but also at the interaction of Merchant and Bank.  
It can be seen from Table 4, that the two methods seem to differ in their results for 
forgery. Our method indicates that forgery is improbable, but Dreier et al., fails the scheme in 
this criterion. This is due to the different definitions of forgery used in these two evaluations. 
Dreier et al., define forgery as the double spending of e-cash data, while we use the standard 
definition of forgery: the creation of e-cash data by the User without using the Withdrawal 
protocol. The definition used by Dreier et al., only covers the first half of the process that is 
defined in our definition of forgery. 
Our method cannot evaluate the anonymity properties of an e-cash scheme. Our 
method only evaluates the scheme’s protocol, as the anonymity attack is usually conducted 
outside the protocol of e-cash by evaluating the receipt data or the e-cash data itself.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have presented a numerical method for the security evaluation of an e-cash 
scheme. We have shown that this method can produce a quantitative result to evaluate the 
security level. The usage of a Markov chain for evaluation is effective as it can be used to 
evaluate the security of the e-cash scheme. From the comparison made with the pi-calculus 
method in evaluating Chaum’s e-cash scheme, the results are similar. However, there is a 
difference in the result of forgery evaluation between our method and the pi-calculus method. 
The difference comes from the different definitions of forgery used by the two methods. 
Intrinsically, the results do not contradict each other.  
Yet, our method is unable to evaluate the anonymity property of the e-cash scheme. 
This limitation comes from the fact that our method only evaluates the protocol and the events 
directly related to it. Attacks on anonymity lie outside the boundary of the protocol. Anonymity is 
dependent on how the scheme stores its user identities; thus, it is only related to the 
cryptographic scheme and not to the protocol that is used in the e-cash scheme.  
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